We investigate the importance of citizens' opinions about economic impacts of immigration in their countries to their preferences for immigration restriction. We focus on personal views regarding how immigrants would affect the national labour market and the domestic public finance. Our analysis of survey data from 7 EU countries during the period 2002-2003 suggests that personal opinions about these issues do not explain individual preferences for immigration restriction. We find somewhat unexpectedly that employers were more likely to prefer immigration restriction than the rest. Those who relied on unemployment benefits were less likely to prefer immigration restriction than the others, although they were more likely to anticipate a negative labour market impact of immigration. The higher the relative income position, the lower the likelihood of preferring immigration restriction, and also the lower the likelihood of thinking that immigrants would negatively affect the national labour market. However, those whose income was relatively high were more likely to expect a negative net fiscal impact of immigration than low-income citizens.
Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration in the welfare state. Existing studies have asked, using opinion survey data, whether the observed variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction can be explained by economic characteristics of the corresponding respondents. Persons with di¤erent economic characteristics would be a¤ected di¤erently by immigrants with certain economic characteristics, for the labor market and/or the public …nance need adjust to immigration by a¤ecting economic situations of persons who are already in the country. The literature has been concerned with whether the variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction re ‡ect economically self-interested thinking.
Immigrant workers increase the stock of labor in their destination countries, other things equal. If their labor can substitute for existing labor and does not cost producers more than the ongoing pay, the existing, replaceable workers should like to stop such immigration. However, there are also other production factors, such as capital, that immigrant labor can complement. The owners of such factors should demand immigrant workers. An economically self-interested person's preference for immigration restriction should then be explained by her/his factor endowments.
1 For instance, the cross country stud- 1 The argument here is one of the short run because production factors owned by existing workers are assumed to be …xed. This assumption might well be appropriate for instance for existing senior workers who …nd it di¢ cult to adjust their labor skills to changing labor market conditions. On the other hand, preferences based on the short-run perspective may be inappropriate if the quality and the quantity of production factors owned by citizens can react to immigration through for example human capital investment. In such a case, even existing workers who can be substituted by immigrants may bene…t by changing their labor skills in a longer run, which may in turn cause a gradual increase in the intensity of competition in labor markets that are not directly a¤ected by immigration in the short run. Thus, individual preferences for immigration restriction depend not only on the factors that citizens currently own but also on the factors that they can own in the future. Whether shortor long-run perspective is more important to preferences for immigration restriction than the other is an empirical question. This endogeneity was emphasized by Chiswick (1989) . Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Tamura (2004) :   Table 4) found that, in developed countries, those whose occupations required high skills were less likely to prefer immigration restriction than those whose occupations required low skills. Since the skill levels of immigrants are generally low relative to those of natives in developed countries, the …nding provides some evidence that individual preferences for immigration restriction re ‡ect economic reasoning based on factor endowments.
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If immigrants are on average net users of the welfare system, immigration implies a need for extra revenue, other things equal. In developed countries where taxation is progressive, high-income residents would then have a disproportionately larger share of the increased burden than low-income residents, while persons with very low income may not need to share that burden at all.
If the government decides to cut bene…ts rather than generate extra revenue, the burden-sharing position of high-and low-income residents would change, assuming that govenment bene…ts form a larger part of the total income for low-than high-income persons. The argument suggests that individual preferences for restricting immigration depend on whether immigrants are on average thought to contribute to or bene…t from government co¤ers in net terms. However, the magnitude of immigration's net …scal impact that is felt at the individual level depends on the income level of the resident in question as well as the …scal adjustment channel. 3 Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter's (2005: This paper provides additional evidence on whether the variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction re ‡ect economically self-interested thinking. Our contributions to the literature are twofold. First, we …nd that the variations in personal views about immigrants' overall impacts on the national labor market and the domestic public …nance are not able to explain the variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction. Earlier studies found that personal opinions about the labor market impact of immigration in ‡uenced individual preferences for immigration restriction, eg, the US studies by Espenshade and Hempstead (1996 : Table A8 ) and Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997: Table 1 , Speci…cations III and V) and the cross country study by Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000 : Table 6 ). Citrin et al. also found that opinions about the net …scal impact of immigration mattered to preferences for restricting immigration.
However, the results of these single-equation studies might have su¤ered from an endogeneity problem if personal opinions about immigrants'economic impact are correlated with unobservable characteristics of respondents that may be contained in the error term. For example, some persons would have generally negative attitudes toward foreigners, which would result in a preference for immigration restriction as well as a negative opinion about immigrants'economic impact. In an attempt to deal with this potential problem, some single-equation studies use proxy variables based on responses to questions that are related to, for instance, racism. Having several subjective regressors in an equation may, however, introduce multicollinearity. Hence we take a di¤erent approach.
We estimate the reduced forms for the personal opinions and the structural equation for the individual preferences jointly, exploiting the correlations among such omitted unobservable characteristics across the equations that belong to a particular person. We compare the estimates from univariate and multivariate probit models and …nd that, while both labor market and public …nance concerns show both statistically and practically signi…cant contributions to the variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction in the case of univariate probit, the statistical signi…cance disappears in the case of multivariate probit. Our results might suggest that concerns about overall economic e¤ects of immigration were not important factors for EU citizens' preferences for restricting immigration from poorer European countries.
Second, we …nd somewhat unexpectedly that employers were more likely to prefer immigration restriction than the rest in our sample of 7 EU countries about a year before the May 2004 expansion of the Union.
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Existing studies do not distinguish between employers and the others, while employers are often thought to bene…t from the availability of immigrant labor. Our …nding is counterintuitive at …rst glance. However, there is some evidence that selfemployed immigrants from Eastern Europe had been on the increase since the signing of Europe Agreements between the then EU members and candidate countries in the 1990s. The agreements allowed citizens of the latter to set up their own businesses in the former, encouraging east-west migration via the self-employment route. Our …nding might imply that employers were concerned with competition intensi…ed by immigration.
The next section describes the data. Section 3 presents preliminary results 6 from univariate probit estimation. Section 4 describes the trivariate probit model used for the main results presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
All the tables referred to in Sections 3 and 5 are attached to the end of the paper. Each respondent was asked to choose one of 11 categories that were ordered from '0'(= take away) to '10'(= help create). We collapse these to create a binary variable, labor, that indicates whether citizen i anticipated a negative labor market e¤ect of immigration, ie,
Data
1 if either '0','1','2','3'or '4'was selected 0 otherwise.
Note that this variable does not necessarily capture a citizen's opinion about immigration's e¤ect on some speci…c labor markets that are relevant to the 7 See Subsection 2.2 about explanatory variables. 8 The proportion of missing observations in each country is low: the highest is .063 in Denmark. The reason why we dichotomize this and the following two ordered categorical variables is because we do not have a program that implements trivariate ordered probit at our disposal. See Section 4 about the model. 8 respondent: the question asks about its overall impact on the national labor market. However, we will later …nd some sign that implies that labor might well capture economic self-interest.
The second dependent variable captures a citizen's view about immigration's net impact on the domestic public …nance. It is based on the responses to the following question:
Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?
Each respondent was asked to choose one of 11 categories that were ordered from '0'(= take more out) to '10'(= put more in). We collapse these to create a binary variable, f iscal, that indicates whether citizen i anticipated a negative net e¤ect of immigration on his/her country's public …nance, ie,
Note that, the same as labor, this variable does not necessarily capture a citizen's opinion about immigration's impact on the person through its e¤ect on the domestic public …nance. However, we will later …nd some evidence that f iscal might well capture economic self-interest.
One objective of the paper is to examine determinants of labor and f iscal.
However, the paper's main purpose is to investigate how important these personal opinions are to individual preferences for immigration restriction. There-9 fore, we use these two opinion variables to explain our third dependent variable that indicates whether a respondent had a preference for immigration restriction. We are interested in pre-expansion EU citizens'preferences with respect to immigration from the countries that were about to join the Union in 2004.
The variable is hence based on the responses to the following question:
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To what extent do you think [the country where the respondent was questioned] should allow people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?
Each respondent was asked to choose one of the following 4 ordered categories: 'none', 'a few', 'some'and 'many'. We collapse these to create a binary variable, anti, that indicates a preference for immigration restriction, ie,
1 if either 'none'or 'a few'was selected 0 otherwise.
We should note that the questions on which labor and f iscal are based did not ask speci…cally about migrants from poorer European countries. We need bear this in mind in interpreting our results.
Explanatory variables
Immigration restriction is likely to be preferred by existing workers who expect immigrant workers to a¤ect them adversely in their labor markets. Those workers who can easily be substituted by immigrants might fear an immediate increase in the intensity of labor market competition. The other workers who cannot easily be replaced by immigrants might see potential bene…ts of immigration if they are complementary to immigrants in production.
12 Accordingly, the …rst variable of interest is a continuous measure that approximates the degree of labor market competition between each respondent and immigrants, which we created by using Eurostat Census 2001. Not surprisingly, in all 14 countries, the hotel and restaurant industry used 1 2 LaLonde and Topel (1991) found that the impact of immigration on natives' earnings is insigni…cant in the United States. Altonji and Card (1991) found a signi…cantly negative but small e¤ect of immigration on natives'wages in the country. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992: Tables 7.7 and 7.8) found that immigration reduced earnings of unskilled workers relative to skilled workers in the country by increasing the supply of unskilled labor. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) reviewed these and other studies on the labor market impact of immigration in the United States in detail and concluded that it is negative but trivial. See also LaLonde and Topel (1997: 819-827) for another review. The past studies typically examined correlations between native wages and the presence of immigrants by location, eg, US metropolitan areas, and found them negative but weak or insigni…cant. This might be because of natives'reactions to immigration, eg, moving to another location or industry. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996) separated their data by native mobility and found that the growth of foreign workers slowed the growth of wages for unskilled native workers who stayed with the same …rm, while the wage growth among those who moved to another …rm was not a¤ected in Austria. Borjas (2003) de…ned labor skill in terms of both education and work experience and made the size of the native workforce in each group stable over time, lessening the complication that arises from natives'reactions to immigration in the labor market. He then found a 10% increase in immigration in a skill group depressed the corresponding wage by 3 to 4 percent in the United States. De New and Zimmermann (1994) found not only a negative wage impact on unskilled natives but also a small positive wage e¤ect on skilled natives in Germany. Gang and RiveraBatiz (1994) suggest that education, work experience and unskilled labor are complementary inputs. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) show that the positive wage e¤ect is likely to be dominant because immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes. See also footnote 1. A …gure greater than 1 indicates that the share of non-citizens in the corresponding industrial group's employment is relatively high. y at = Austria, be = Belgium, de = Germany, dk = Denmark, es = Spain, … = Finland, fr = France, gr = Greece, ie = Ireland, it = Italy, lu = Luxembourg, nl = Netherlands, pt = Portugal, se = Sweden, uk = United Kingdom z a = agriculture, hunting, forestry; b = …shing; c = mining, quarrying; d = manufacturing; e = electricity, gas, water supply; f = construction; g = wholesale/retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household goods; h = hotels, restaurants; i = transport, storage, communication; j = …nancial intermediation; k = real estate/renting/business activities; l = public administration, defence, compulsory social security; m = eduaction; n = health/social work; o = other community/social/personal service activities; p = household activities; q = extraterritorial organisations/bodies Further details about the categories are in Eurostat, 1996, NACE Rev. 1: Statistical Classi…cation of Economic Activities in the European Community.
many foreign workers (category h). Another industry is of household activities (category p), eg, housemaids. In the other industries, however, we see variations across the countries. We also con…rm our expectation that the use of the average skill level of immigrant workers-which tends to be low relative to citizens in these countries-is not suitable for representing labor substitutability. For instance, while the construction sector (category f) hired many foreign workers in more than half the countries, they also seem to have been highly present in the education sector (category m) in Finland and the health and social service sector (category n) in the United Kingdom. The required skills in immigrantconcentrated sectors thus vary considerably.
ESS collected a two-digit NACE Rev.1 code for each respondent, and hence we know to which NACE Rev.1 major group he or she belonged. We assign the relevant …gure in Table 2 .1 to each ESS respondent. 14 We call this variable isb. Unfortunately, a two-digit NACE Rev.1 code is not available for more than 20 percent of respondents in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain. We drop observations in these countries from the sample, for we do not have su¢ cient information for imputation. 15 Furthermore, in the remaining 10 countries, we removed observations that belonged to extraterritorial organizations (category q). The sector should naturally employ many foreign workers, and Table 2 .1 con…rms that in 5 countries. The exclusion of the observations should remove outliers, for the proportion of citizens who belonged to such an organization in 13 each of these 5 countries is extremely low: the highest is .015 in France.
The second variable of interest is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent was unemployed and looking for a job in the last seven days and 0 otherwise.
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By using this binary variable, we check whether unemployed workers were more likely to think that immigrants have a negative labor market e¤ect than the others. We call this variable unemploy.
The third variable of interest is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent employed at least one person and 0 otherwise. 17 Our expectation is that employers are less likely to prefer immigration restriction, for they might bene…t from immigrants who could reduce the cost of production via their impact on the labor market or increase the returns to production factors that are owned by employers and are complementary to immigrant labor. We call this variable employer.
We are also interested in potential in ‡uence of public …nance concerns on Therefore, we drop the observations in that category.
We then divide each …gure by the corresponding number of household members because we examine the importance of economic self-interest to individual opinions. This yields net income per capita assuming, although unrealistic, that household income is shared equally by the members. We …nally divide each …gure by the corresponding national mean net income per capita. The variable measures the relative income position of each respondent in her/his country.
For instance, 1.5 implies that the respondent's net income is 50 percent higher than the national average. We call this variable relinc.
We have already reduced our sample from 15 to 10 countries due to insu¢ - Low income against against/n.a. for for/n.a. High income against/n.a. against for/n.a. for n.a. = not applicable cient data on isb. We further drop Austria, Germany and Portugal from our sample because of a severe lack of data on relinc in these countries, eg, as much as over 50 percent of the Austrian sample. Again, we do not have su¢ cient information for imputation. For instance, education is often thought to be a good proxy for personal income. However, we found the correlation between relinc and education is rather weak in the data. This is advantageous to our analysis, however, because we want to separate the in ‡uence of education and that of income on the dependent variables.
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We also create more direct measures to indicate whether a respondent was a net bene…ciary of the welfare state. ESS contains the data on the main source of each respondent's household income. There are 3 categories related to social welfare bene…ts: 'pension', 'unemployment or redundancy bene…t'and 'other social welfare bene…t'. 20 We create dummy variables, pension, unempb and otherb, respectively for these categories. Note that we created earlier a binary variable which indicates whether a respondent was unemployed and looking for a job in the last seven days, ie, unemploy. This variable is not the same as unempb because the latter refers to the household while the former is about the individual. We …nd that, in each of the 7 countries, the number of unemployed respondents whose households mainly depended on bene…ts related to unemployment or redundancy is lower than the total number of respondents 1 9 In the samples used by Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006) , the progressivity of taxation and the generosity of social welfare provision vary according to the location of a respondent. However, across the 7 countries we examine, these do not vary su¢ ciently. Their net replacement ratios (the ratio of the net income during unemployment to the net income during employment) given by OECD (2004: 2 0 Pension is not speci…ed as public pension in the list of alternatives and hence potentially include both public and private pension. However, the list includes 'income from investment, savings and the like'as an alternative, which might be likely to be chosen in the case of private pension. Hence we assume 'pension'mainly represents public, rather than private, pension. 16 whose households mainly depended on such bene…ts.
Other explanatory variables include purely exogenous variables such as a respondent's gender (f emale) and approximate age in years in 2003. Each respondent's level of education is indicated by 3 edu dummies. 21 We also have an indicator of whether at least one parent of a respondent was born abroad (f parent). By this dummy variable, we try to capture inherently different attitudes between immigrant-originating citizens and native citizens. A respondent's closeness to immigrants is approximated by the number of immigrant friends she/he had (2 f riend dummies). In addition, we use a measure of a respondent's exposure to the media on current a¤airs and politics (media) in hours per weekday.
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The media is often thought to in ‡uence one's view, and we want to control such potential in ‡uence. Table 2 .2 provides summary statistics for our variables.
Preliminary results
In this section, we examine the determinants of labor, f iscal and anti in turn.
We present univariate probit results which we will subsequently compare with the corresponding multivariate probit results to check if the results in this section are robust. In all speci…cations, we include age, f emale, f parent, media, f riend dummies and country dummies as exogenous variables. The reference 2 1 ESS sorted respondents into 7 groups according to a modi…ed version of ISCED97. We collapse these into 4 groups by merging 'less than primary'and 'primary or basic (1st stage)', 'upper secondary' and 'postsecondary (non-tertiary)', and 'tertiary (1st stage)' and 'tertiary (2nd stage)'. The reason for merging is to avoid having a category with a very small number of observations in some countries.
2 2 We create this variable by using the responses to the 3 separate questions: On an average weekday, how much of your time is spent watching television (A2) / listening to the radio (A4) / reading newspapers (A6) about politics and current a¤airs? The responses to these questions were given on the same scale that has an equal interval in hours between categories. This enables us to aggregate the responses at the individual level. group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend nor a parent who was born abroad. Each observation is ESS-weighted in estimation.
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The four tables for this section will report estimated marginal e¤ects at the sample mean of each explanatory variable or di¤erences between 0 and 1 in the case of binary explanatory variables.
Labor market concern
We …rst examine the determinants of labor by univariate probit. We …nd that the likelihood of anticipating a negative labor market impact of immigration would be lower by .06 if at least one parent was born abroad than otherwise. The estimated marginal e¤ects of f riend dummies suggest that the more immigrant friends a respondent had the less likely he/she was to expect a negative labor market impact of immigration. The probability of labor = 1 is lower by 0.18 among those who had several immigrant friends than those who had none. These estimates of f parent and f riend dummies may represent e¤ects of a respondent's proximity to immigrants on her/his personal view. We additionally …nd that the number of hours spent on the media about current a¤airs and politics per weekday had a negative marginal e¤ect on the likelihood: the estimate suggests that 5 additional hours exposed to the media may lower the probability of labor = 1 from the sample mean by .10. This might be a 19 consequence of acquiring various views on the issue via a larger number of hours spent on the media: those who are not well exposed to di¤erent opinions may well form a biased view. The estimated marginal e¤ects of media, f parent and f riend dummies are the same in sign and similar in magnitude across the four speci…cations in the table.
[ Table 3 .1 about here] Speci…cation 3.1B adds two dummy variables of interest to 3.1A, namely, unemploy and employer. We …nd the estimated marginal e¤ects of both variables signi…cant. The sign of the e¤ect of unemploy is positive: the unemployed were more likely to think than the rest that immigrants impact on the national labor market would be negetaive. This seems to con…rm our expectation that they are the ones who fear a further increase in labor market competition. The result agrees with the …nding by Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000: Table 3, Model 4). The sign of the estimated marginal e¤ect of employer also con…rms our expectation that employers would be less likely to anticipate a negative labor market e¤ect of immigration than the rest because they are likely to own production factors that complement immigrant labor. These …ndings seem to imply that, although labor is about immigration's general impact on the national labor market, it might re ‡ect each respondent's economic self-interest.
Speci…cation 3.1C further adds educational attainment dummies to 3.1B.
The reference group had achieved a uppersecondary or nontertiary postsecondary level (edu2). These dummies'estimated marginal e¤ects indicate that the level of educational attainment is negatively related to the likelihood of ex-20 pecting a negative labor market impact of immigration.
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We observe that the e¤ects of unemploy and employer survive after controlling education, while the e¤ect of isb not only remains insigni…cant but also becomes smaller in size.
Speci…cation 3.1D drops isb from 3.1C. This exclusion does not change what 3.1C suggests, and the resulting fall in the pseudo-R 2 is small.
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Some studies in the literature interpret the signi…cant, negative e¤ect of education as a con…rmation that citizens expect immigrants to be relatively unskilled and to substitute existing unskilled labor and complement skilled labor in the destination. To interpret our results in this way, …rst we need to assume that the respondents'answers that generate labor re ‡ect economic self-interest.
In other words, they took the labor-market question given in subsection 2.1 personally, ignoring the word "generally"in it. The estimated marginal e¤ects of unemploy and employer may indicate that this might well be the case.
Suppose this is the case. Then, we can check whether our edu dummies can be interpreted as proxies for labor skills by splitting the sample by labor force participation. We thus follow Scheve and Slaughter (2001) . Among those who were out of the labor force, labor skills should not matter. We estimated speci…cation 3.1C by splitting our sample in two ways. 26 In one case, we treat those in education as being out of the labor force. In the other case, we treat them as being in the labor force. Table 3 .2 shows that edu dummies exhibit the same relationship with labor whether respondents were in or out of the labor force. Accordingly, we are unable to treat edu dummies as proxies for 21 labor skills in our sample. We therefore take the position that has been taken mainly by non-economists: education is associated with less negative attitude in general, eg, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007).
[ Table 3 .2 about here] Table 3 .2 gives us a few additional insights. First, it implies that a significant, negative marginal e¤ect of employer comes from those who were out of the labor force. The magnitude is larger in Table 3 .2 than in Table 3 .1. Those who were both employed and employing simultaneously do not indicate a lower likelihood of perceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration. Second, the estimated marginal e¤ect of isb is positive and signi…cant among those who were out of the labor force. As we discussed in subsection 2.2, the sector of each respondent is based on his/her current as well as past work. Therefore, isb …gures exist even among those who were out of the labor force. The signi…cant positive marginal e¤ects in the second and the fourth columns might well imply that there were respondents who had to leave the labor force because of the competition that was intensi…ed by foreign workers in certain sectors.
Public …nance concern
In this subsection, we examine the determinants of f iscal by univariate probit.
Speci…cation 3.3A in Table 3 .3 adds a variable of main interest, relinc, to the right side of the equation. Its estimated marginal e¤ect is negative and significant at 5 percent, which suggests that lower intranational net relative income per capita results in a higher probability of perceiving a negative net impact of 22 immigration on the domestic public …nance. This might be in line with the case where current social welfare bene…ciaries are more concerned with a potential increase in the number of net bene…ciaries because they fear bene…t cuts.
However, the magnitude of the e¤ect is small: it implies that a 50 percentage point decrease in the relative income position from the sample mean, ie, from 1 to .5, would increase the probability only by .003. The estimated marginal e¤ects of media, f riend dummies and f parent are all negative as in Table 3 .1 for labor in the previous subsection.
[ Table 3 .3 about here]
Speci…cation 3.3B adds three dummy variables of interest to 3.3A, namely, pension, unempb and otherb. We …nd that none of these dummies has a signi…cant marginal e¤ect on the probability of perceiving a negative net …scal impact of immigration. We also observe that the estimated marginal e¤ect of relinc becomes insigni…cant. The estimated marginal e¤ects of the other control variables do not change. Note that, although the estimated e¤ects of relinc, pension, unempb and otherb are individually insigni…cant, we found that they are jointly signi…cant at 1 percent.
Speci…cation 3.3C therefore does not drop any of these but further adds edu dummies to 3.3B. The estimated marginal e¤ect of relinc then regains statistical signi…cance, but with the positive sign this time. This suggests that after controlling education there is a positive relationship between the intranational relative net income per capita and the likelihood of perceiving a negative net …scal impact of immigration. A theoretical explanation for this relationship is that, under a progressive taxation system, a person with higher 23 earnings is a¤ected by …scal adjustments via taxation disproportionately more than someone with lower earnings. Hence high-income earners should be more concerned with a potentially negative impact of immigration on the domestic public …nance than the others. The inclusion of edu dummies does not make any of pension, unempb and otherb important, although they are jointly signi…cant at 5 percent. Speci…cation 3.3D drops these three dummies from 3.3C, but we …nd that the estimated marginal e¤ects of the other explanatory variables remain almost the same. The marginal e¤ects of edu dummies indicate that the higher educational attainment a respondent had the less likely she/he was to perceive a negative net …scal impact of immigration. Thus, as we found in Table 3 .1 for explaining labor, education seems to reduce the probability that a person expresses a negative view regarding economic impacts of immigration.
Preference for immigration restriction
We now use labor and f iscal as independent variables in explaining the variations in anti, for our main purpose is to investigate the importance of personal views about immigration's economic impacts to individual preferences for immigration restriction. Speci…cation 3.4A in Table 3 .4 suggests that the estimated marginal e¤ects of both economic concerns are positive and signi…cant. Perceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration seems to increase the probability that the respondent prefers immigration restriction by .18. The probability of preferring immigration restriction is greater by .20 among those who perceived a negative net …scal impact of immigration than those who did not. The …ndings seem to suggest that these two economic concerns are reasonably important factors behind individual preferences for immigration restriction.
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The estimated marginal e¤ects of media, f parent and f riend dummies are very similar across the four speci…cations in the table and also to the estimates in Tables 3.1 and 3 .3.
[ Table 3 .4 about here] Speci…cation 3.4B adds educational attainment dummies to 3.4A. The inclusion of these variables does not change the estimated marginal e¤ects of labor and f iscal much. The estimated marginal e¤ects of the education dummies con…rm our expectation that the more educated a respondent was the less likely the person was to be anti-immigration.
In the previous subsections, we found that both the status of being unemployed and being an employer respectively made a di¤erence to the opinion about the labor market impact of immigration. We also found that the opinion about the net …scal impact of immigration depended on the relative income position. Speci…cation 3.4C adds to 3.4B these variables interacted with the corresponding opinion variables. The estimated marginal e¤ect of labor employer is signi…cant and positive, suggesting that the contribution of labor market concern to the likelihood of preferring immigration restriction might be much more important for employers than for the rest. However, note that we found in Table 3 .1 that employers were less likely to perceive a negative labor market impact of immigration. The estimated marginal e¤ect of f iscal relinc in this speci…cation is signi…cant only at 90 percent.
Speci…cation 3.4D adds to 3.4C more interaction terms to check whether any of the variables which we found insigni…cant in Tables 3.1 and 3 .3 makes a di¤erence to the importance of labor and f iscal to anti. We …nd none of 25 the added, interaction terms signi…cant, while the estimated marginal e¤ect of f iscal relinc becomes signi…cant at 99 percent. Its sign is negative, indicating that, although we found in Table 3 .3 that relative income per capita was positively related to the probability of perceiving a negative net …scal impact of immigration, the contribution of public …nance concern to the probability of preferring immigration restriction is less important to high-than low-income earners among those who thought that immigrants were net bene…ciaries of the welfare system.
Model
In our preliminary analysis, we estimated the three equations of interest separately by univariate probit. Table 3 .4 suggested that the perception of a negative impact of immigration on the national labor market and/or the domestic public …nance contributes to a preference for immigration restriction from poorer countries in Europe. However, we suspect that both labor and f iscal are endogenous in the equation for explaining anti. Let 1 [ ] be the indicator function which is equal to 1 if the condition inside the square brackets is met and 0 otherwise. Our model consists of the following three equations:
Note that, for a given respondent, the error terms are likely to be correlated through her/his unobservable characteristics, eg, negative/positive attitude in We used mvprobit, the Stata T M command by Cappellari and Jenkins, which uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator to evaluate multidimensional normal integrals in the likelihood function. The number of pseudo-random standard uniform variates being drawn when calculating the simulated likelihood is 99: close to p n. Our study di¤ers from Dustmann and Preston (2004; who estimated a system of equations in stages.
2 9 Estimated marginal e¤ects from trivariate probit estimation is not directly comparable with the ones from univariate probit estimation because there are eight types of predicted probability for the former, eg, Pr (anti = 1; labor = 1; f iscal = 1). Hence we present estimated coe¢ cients. 27 seems to con…rm our earlier …nding that the contribution of labor market concern to the probability of preferring immigration restriction might have been important for employers if they perceived a negative e¤ect of immigration. We also obtain a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient on f iscal relinc, which appears to con…rm our earlier …nding that the contribution of public …nance concern to the probability of preferring immigration restriction might have been less important for high-than low-income earners.
We also notice that the estimated coe¢ cients on media, f parent and f riend dummies are all insigni…cant in the case of trivariate probit, while they are all signi…cant in the case of univariate probit. The negative coe¢ cients on Ireland and Sweden are signi…cant, which appears to be consistent with the fact that these two countries are the ones that immediately opened their labor market to the newly joining member countries on 1 May 2004.
[ Table 5 .1 about here] Turning to the equation for labor, the results from trivariate probit suggest that neither the status of being unemployed nor the status of being an employer makes a di¤erence in terms of perceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration. This is in contrast to what the corresponding univariate probit results suggest. The other coe¢ cients are roughly the same between univariate and trivariate probit. Although the sign of the estimated coe¢ cient on isb changes from positive to negative, it is signi…cant only at 10 percent.
Turning to the equation for f iscal, the trivaraite probit results are almost the same as the corresponding univaraite probit results. We con…rm that the estimated coe¢ cient on the intracountry relative net income position is signi…cantly positive, suggesting that the higher the relative income position of a respondent was the more likely the person was to anticipate a negative net …scal impact of immigration, other things equal. Table 5 .1 also provides, at its bottom, estimated correlation coe¢ cients between a pair of the error terms of the three equations. The …gures suggest that there is a positive correlation between the error terms of the equations for explaining labor and f iscal.
30 This suggests that these equations share the same unobservables in the error terms. However, negative 12 and 13 are small in magnitude and also insigni…cant. These two correlation coe¢ cients measure the associations between the error terms after the in ‡uence of labor and f iscal are accounted for in the equation for explaining anti. The two opinion variables would include the unobservables, u 2 and u 3 , respectively. This is probably the reason why 12 and 13 are insigni…cant.
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We have found neither labor nor f iscal signi…cant in the equation for explaining anti. However, we have some evidence of a positive association between labor and f iscal. The weighted cross-product ratio between these opinion variables is 4.76, which indicates that the probability that both variables are equal to 1 for a given citizen is almost 5 times as high as the probability that only one of them is equal to 1. In addition, Table 5 .1 shows large standard errors for the estimated coe¢ cients on these variables in the case of trivariate probit.
Therefore, we check if multicollinearity is responsible for the insigni…cance of these two opinion variables.
[ Table 5 .2 about here] 3 0 Bivariate probit estimation results in a positive correlation of a similar order of magnitude between the error terms of these two equations. The results are available upon request.
3 1 See Greene (2003: 716-717) .
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Speci…cation 5.2A in Table 5 .2 drops …ve variables involving f iscal from 3.4D of Table 5 .1, leaving four variables related to labor market concern in explaining anti. This exclusion does not make the estimated coe¢ cient on labor signi…cant. However, as we found in Table 5 .1, the estimated coe¢ cient on labor employer remains signi…cantly positive. As a result of the exclusion, the negative coe¢ cients on media, f parent and f riend dummies regain signi…cance.
We also notice that, as a result of the exclusion, 13 becomes signi…cantly positive while 12 remains insigni…cant. That is, the error terms of the equations for explaining anti and f iscal now appear to share the same unobservables.
Speci…cation 5.2B in Table 5 .2 drops four variables involving labor from 3.4D of Table 5 .1, leaving …ve variables related to public …nance concern in explaining anti. The exclusion does not make the estimated coe¢ cient on f iscal signi…cant. But, as we found in Table 5 .1, the estimated coe¢ cient on f iscal relinc remains signi…cantly negative. We also note that the estimated coe¢ cients on media and f riend dummies are signi…cant only at 10 percent, while that on f parent is insigni…cant. In Table 5 .1, they were all insigni…cant.
As for the correlation between the error terms, we …nd that both 12 and 13 are insigni…cant.
Speci…cation 5.2C in the table drops all variables involving either labor or f iscal from 3.4D of Table 5.1. As a result, we …nd that both 12 and 13 become signi…cantly positive. This is probably because labor and f iscal contain subjective bias that is not controlled in the equations for explaining these two opinion variables.
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What the results in Table 5 .2 suggest is that the insigni…cance of labor and 3 2 In these equations, we do not have an opinion variable on the right side.
30
f iscal in explaining anti is perhaps not due to multicollinearity. Furthermore, the …nding that 12 is insigni…cant in Speci…cation 5.2B implies that the unobservables in the error term of the equation for explaining labor might be contained in the variations in f iscal relinc. In Table 5 .3, we present estimated coe¢ cients from seemingly unrelated trivariate probit where we drop the opinion variables and instead include all variables of interest used to explain either labor or f iscal. We want to check the e¤ect of each non-subjective variable on our three dependent variables. The correlation coe¢ cients between a pair of the error terms of the equations are all signi…cantly positive, which perhaps captures unexplained subjective bias that each respondent had.
[ Table 5 .3 about here]
We …nd relinc signi…cant in all three equations. It positively contributes to the probability of perceiving a negative net …scal impact of immigration, which is consistent with our earlier …nding. We …nd that it negatively contributes to the probability of perceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration and also the probability of preferring immigration restriction. The negative contribution to the latter is slightly smaller in magnitude compared with the estimated coe¢ cients on f iscal relinc in Tables 5.1 and 5 .2, but it suggests that not the interaction term but relinc on its own has a negative relationship with anti.
We …nd that, while unemploy remains insigni…cant, the estimated coe¢ -cient on unempb is signi…cantly positive in explaining labor. Note that, while unemploy indicates whether the respondent was unemployed, unempb indicates whether the main source of household income was an unemployment bene…t.
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The …nding might suggest that those who had to rely on unemployment bene…ts for living form a more homogeneous group than those who were unemployed and looking for a job. That is, a threat of labor market competition intensi…ed by immigrants might well be more serious for those who rely on unemployment bene…ts.
Citizens who depended on unemployment bene…ts for living were less likely to prefer immigration restriction even though they were more likely to think that immigrants would have a negative impact on the national labor market. Table 5 .3 also suggests that those who relied on pension for living were more likely to prefer immigration restriction.
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Finally, the table implies that employers were more likely to prefer immigration restriction than the others. The positive coe¢ cient is similar in magnitude to those on labor employer in Tables 5.1 and 5 .2, and this probably suggests that not the interaction term but employer on its own has a positive relationship with anti.
Discussion
One of the main …ndings of this paper is that the variations in citizens'opinions about immigrants'overall impact on the labor market and the public …nance of their countries do not explain the variations in their preferences for immigration restriction. It appears that although these economic issues were debated with respect to the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the European Union around the time of the 2004 expansion, they were not important to the preferences of the then EU citizens. Our two opinion variables are about overall e¤ects of immigration and are not necessarily the same as the anticipated e¤ects speci…c to each respondent. However, we also found in the results from the estimation of the reduced forms for the two opinion variables that these variables seem to re ‡ect some economic self-interest of each respondent. The results seem to suggest that perceived immigrants' economic impact does not determine whether a citizen is anti-or pro-immigration even if the impact in question is speci…c to him/her. An implication is that economic arguments for and against the free-movement-of-workers principle might not be able to in ‡u-ence the extent of citizens'support for it, whether they respectively would gain or lose economically.
Another …nding which is also new to the literature is that citizen employers were more likely to be anti-immigration than the rest. We expected the opposite, ie, employers are more pro-immigration than the rest, by reasoning that they would bene…t from immigrant labor that is likely to increase the returns to production factors which they own. Immigrants may also solve labor shortage at a low cost. Our …nding is thus counterintuitive at …rst glance. However, there is some evidence that self-employed immigrants from Eastern Europe had been on the increase since the mid-1990s. For instance, the UK's Home O¢ ce In the period 1991-1996, the signing of Europe Agreements between the then member countries and candi-33 date countries took place. The agreements allowed nationals of the latter to enter the Union via self-employment. 35 Our …nding might then imply that employers were concerned with competition intensi…ed by immigration. 36 If this is the case, economic self-interest does matter to preferences for immigration restriction.
The limitation of this study is that, as a consequence of attempting to preserve a good representation of each country's citizen population, our sample contains only 7 EU countries of the pre-2004 enlargement. Since these countries are not very di¤erent from each other in terms of tax progressivity and welfare generosity, we were unable to study welfare state determinants in the way that Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006) did. 37 If ESS could conduct another immigration module from the EU27 countries in the future, this limitation might be overcome.
3 5 An Europe Agreement was signed with Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Slovak Republic (1993), Czech Republic (1993), Latvia (1995) , Lithuania (1995) , Estonia (1995) and Slovenia (1996) of the 10 newly joining countries. The accession by Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972) were not subject to Transitional Arrangements from 1 May 2004 onwards. Note also that an Association Agreement was signed with Romania (1993) and Bulgaria (1993) , providing nationals of these countries with entries via self-employment. The agreements are in the O¢ cial Journal of the European Union (europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/index.htm), and a list of the relevant volumes of the jounal can be found in the document about the 2004 enlargement (europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50017.htm).
3 6 Although Belgium was excluded from our sample, European Industrial Relations Observatory (www.eiro.eurofound.europa.eu/2005/09/feature/be0509303f.html) gives a view shared by Belgian building companies, which implies such intensi…ed competition.
They argue that they lose a large number of contracts due to foreign subcontracting and pseudo-selfemployment. However, in their case, the solution is seen to be freedom for Belgian companies to employ foreign construction workers in the country, which is more in line with our preanalysis expectation than the …nding. Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
The reference group is UK males who attained the uppersecondary or the nontertiary postsecondary level of education (edu2) and had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a parent who was born abroad. Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
For the out-of-the-labor-force group, unemploy is not applicable.
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary postsecondary level of education (edu2). Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary postsecondary level of education (edu2). Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation rho is the estimated correlation between the error terms from the two equations. For example, rho12 is rho between the equations for explaining anti and labor.
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